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Abstract—In cryptology, verifiable computing aims at verifying
the remote execution of a program on an untrusted machine,
based on its I/O and constant-sized evidence collected during its
execution. Recent cryptographic schemes and compilers enable
practical verifiable computations for some programs written in C,
but their soundness with regards to C semantics remains informal
and poorly understood.
We present the first certified, semantics-preserving compiler
for verifiable computing. Based on CompCert and developed in
Coq, our compiler targets an architecture whose instructions
consist solely of quadratic equations over a large finite field,
amenable to succinct verification using the Pinocchio crypto-
graphic scheme. We explain how to encode the integer operations
of a C program first to quadratic equations, then to a single
cryptographically-checkable polynomial test. We formally prove
that, when compilation succeeds, there is a correct execution
of the source program for any I/O that pass this test. We link
our compiler to the Pinocchio cryptographic runtime, and report
experimental results as we compile, run, and verify the execution
of sample C programs.
I. INTRODUCTION
In cryptology, verifiable computing aims at safely outsourc-
ing the execution of a program to an untrusted machine:
• given some inputs, the worker executes the program and
accumulates cryptographic evidence; it then returns the
resulting program outputs and evidence;
• given some inputs, outputs, and evidence, the verifier
checks their consistency to confirm that those I/O indeed
reflect a correct execution of that program.
We expect the verification process to be simpler and more
efficient than the original computation. (Otherwise, the verifier
would just discard the evidence and re-execute the program.)
Besides verifier performance, another motivation may be that
the verifier does not have access to data available to the worker,
inasmuch as that data is deemed private, or is too big. On the
other hand, verifiable computing often incurs a large overhead
for the worker to produce evidence.
Novel cryptographic schemes enable the non-interactive
verification of general computations in constant time, and
even efficient implementations, interpreters, and compilers.
In particular, Pinocchio [1] and its Geppetto compiler [2] take
as input a C program and yield a public verification key such
that verifying the program I/O and evidence with this key
ensures that the worker correctly executed this program with
these I/O. Pinocchio has been applied to various programs (e.g.
for linear algebra, encryption, data processing, and even X.509
certificate-chain validation) that perform millions of operations,
and yet its evidence of correct computation consists of just
288 bytes verifiable in ∼ 10 milliseconds.
Pinocchio is not for all C programs: although C is a
convenient language for expressing low-level integer compu-
tations, compiling for cryptographic verification comes with
serious restrictions on program control and data flows. Hence,
Pinocchio compilers are not meant to turn arbitrary C code
into practical VC schemes. They all involve compilation to
circuits, and share their fundamental limitations: computations
are statically bounded; loops are unfolded; and circuitry is
needed for all branches, not just those taken. (This is similar
to the use of FPGAs: by unfolding selected fragments of
a C program to circuits, one can significantly improve its
performance, despite serious restrictions on those fragments.)
Also, as usual with cryptography, the probability that an
adversary will produce false evidence reduces to the probability
of solving (supposedly) hard problems; it is not null, but it can
be made arbitrarily small but using larger keys. For example,
Pinocchio relies on elliptic-curve assumptions; it aims at 128-
bit security, that is, security against computationally bounded
adversaries, able to perform much less than 2128 operations.
Besides cryptographic assumptions, however, the practical
security of Pinocchio also crucially depends on the correctness
of its compiler—why should we trust the verification key to
vouch for the execution of a given source C program? This
question is challenging because:
• Verifiable computing matters precisely when the worker
has an incentive to produce false evidence. He may choose
any execution trace and intermediate values to exploit
corner cases in the compiler or the language semantics.
• The verifier is not given access to intermediate values,
hence she cannot detect anomalous executions. (Pin-
occhio’s evidence seems random; it carries no extra
information about the execution chosen by the worker.)
• The compilation scheme is unusual, and involves novel
encodings and optimizations: Pinocchio encodes the
semantics of programs first into quadratic equations
in a large prime field, then into a single polynomial
divisibility test. To reduce the number of equations, it also
avoids or delays conversions between field elements and
machine integers. Thus, its compiler correctness depends
on complex implicit representation invariants.
• Verifiable computations scale up to millions of instructions,
limiting the scope of manual reviews of the resulting
divisibility test to toy examples, not whole C programs.
For these reasons, static verification techniques, and in par-
ticular certified compilation, can greatly enhance trust in
(dynamically) verifiable computations.
In this paper, we present PinocchioQ, a certified Pinocchio
compiler from C programs (subject to the restrictions discussed
above) to quadratic arithmetic systems and polynomial divisi-
bility tests. We formally relate the success of these tests first to
the existence of a solution of the compiled equation systems,
then to the existence of a correct trace for their source C
programs. We implement and verify our compiler as a variant
of CompCert, a certified C compiler written in Coq, thereby
re-using its formal semantics for C, and supplementing it with
a field arithmetic back-end.
On the other hand, we do not develop a formal computational
probabilistic proof for the core cryptographic constructions
used by Pinocchio (taking the divisibility test to keys). Such
a formal development would be of independent interest but,
as opposed to the compilation process we describe, it is the
focus of detailed pen-and-paper published proofs, and it applies
uniformly to system of quadratic equations, irrespective of the
source program that produced it. Similarly, we do not formalize
the underlying elliptic-curve implementation of the field we
use, whose formal verification remains beyond the state of the
art (see §VIII-C for a discussion of related work). Finally, we
do not address the difficult but independent problem of proving
functional and security properties on source C programs.
The paper makes the following contributions:
1) a first certified compiler for verifiable computation;
2) a formalization of quadratic arithmetic programming, the
encoding technique of Pinocchio, with supporting libraries
for equations and Lagrange polynomials;
3) a new ‘quadratic arithmetic’ back-end for CompCert;
4) a soundness theorem, intuitively saying that the property
checked by the cryptographic scheme—a divisibility test
between formal polynomials—entails the existence of an
execution of the source C program with the same I/O as
those presented by the verifier;
5) an experimental evaluation, obtained by linking our com-
piler to the cryptographic runtime of Geppetto, illustrating
certified verifiable computing on sample C programs.
More generally, we hope that our paper also sheds light on
interesting programming-language semantics and compilation
issues raised by modern cryptography.
Contents. We first review background materials on the
Pinocchio scheme for verifiable computation, its Geppetto
implementation (§II), and the CompCert compiler (§III). We
present the high level architecture of PinocchioQ and explain
its key aspects by example (§IV). We then describe our formal
development: a certified compiler from RTL to quadratic
equations (§V) and formal polynomials (§VI), and give our
main theorem. We evaluate PinocchioQ on sample C programs
(§VII), discuss related work, and conclude (§VIII).
Our formal Coq development and sample C programs are
included in the Pinocchio/Geppetto distribution, available online
at https://vc.codeplex.com/.
II. SUCCINCTLY VERIFYING COMPUTATIONS
We provide a definition of verifiable computation schemes,
and outline the Pinocchio protocol, intuitively the cryptographic
‘machine’ to which we compile C programs. Compilation issues
are postponed to the next sections.
In this paper, we consider general-purpose verifiable-
computation techniques, that apply (in principle) to arbitrary
algorithms, in contrast with cryptographic schemes designed
for a single purpose (such as the verification of online voting
or set intersection).
Complementarily, for many algorithms, it is possible to
write a simpler program that only checks the correctness of
a given result; one can then cryptographically verify runs
of this checker, rather than a full-fledged implementation of
the algorithm. Indeed, any NP algorithm can be verified in
polynomial-time. Consider, for instance, outsourcing a task that
involves SAT solving (see §VII for a programming example).
General verifiable computing only needs to be applied to the
program that produces SAT problems, checks their solutions,
and outputs their relevant parts. Accordingly, the worker may
first use a SAT solver as an (untrusted) oracle to find solutions,
and then produce evidence of running the checker on these
solutions.
A. Terminology
In cryptographic terms, the evidence we consider con-
sists of ‘zero-knowledge, universally-verifiable, succinct, non-
interactive arguments of knowledge’ (or SNARKs for short).
Following cryptographers, and to prevent confusion with our
formal development, we use ‘argument’ instead of ‘proof’ for
schemes that are computationally sound: a computationally-
limited adversary might forge an argument for a property
that does not hold, albeit with a negligible probability. ‘Zero-
knowledge’ means that the evidence does not carry any
information on the instance used by the worker to build the
argument. For Pinocchio, it means that the only information
leaked to the verifier is the existence of a trace with those
I/Os; it is achieved by embedding random factors into the
evidence that cancel out in the verification process. ‘Universally-
verifiable’ and ‘non-interactive’ mean that anyone, given the
verification key, can verify an argument without the need to
interact with the worker. ‘Succinct’ means that the evidence is
small, in our case constant-sized.
B. Protocol description
Figure 1 outlines our verifiable computation scheme, consist-
ing of three algorithms (KeyGen, Prove, Verify). The scheme
is parameterized by a program p that takes inputs ~x and ~y and
produces outputs ~z. We interpret ~x, ~z as public I/O (known by
the worker and the verifier) and ~y as private inputs (known
only by the worker). With Pinocchio, p ranges over quadratic
arithmetic programs (or QAPs, for short), defined in the next
subsection. For simplicity, we omit all security parameters. We
refer to Gennaro et al. [3] and Parno et al. [1] for a more
complete presentation.
Fig. 1. Zero-knowledge verifiable computation protocol
1) EK p,VK p
$←− KeyGen(p), given a QAP p, generates
public keys for evaluation and verification, respectively.
2) π $←− Prove(EK p, ~x, ~y, ~z), given the evaluation key, some
inputs ~x and ~y and some outputs ~z such that p(~x, ~y)
evaluates to ~z, produces evidence π.
3) Verify(VK p, ~x, ~z, π), given the verification key, public
inputs ~x and outputs ~z, and evidence π, returns a Boolean.
(The $ indicates randomized algorithms.) Next, we give the
main properties of Pinocchio:
• Functional correctness: if p(~x, ~y) evaluates to ~z, then
EK p,VK p
$←− KeyGen(p); π $←− Prove(EK p, ~x, ~y, ~z);
Verify(VK p, ~x, ~z, π) always returns true.
• Perfect privacy: π is statistically independent of ~y.
• Computational knowledge soundness: given a probabilistic
polynomial time adversary Adv , there exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time extractor such that, with overwhelming
probability, if EK p,VK p
$←− KeyGen(p);π, ~x, ~z $←−
Adv(EKp, V Kp);Verify(V Kp, ~x, ~z, π) returns true, then
the extractor on the same randomness returns ~y such
that p(~x, ~y) evaluates to ~z. (See Parno et al. [1] for the
underlying computational security assumptions.)
C. Target architecture
In Pinocchio protocols, p ranges over quadratic arithmetic
programs (QAPs), that is, systems of equations over variables
~x in a field Fq (for a large fixed prime q), each equating
a product of two linear combinations on ~x to a third linear
combination on ~x:
Definition 1: A quadratic arithmetic program Q of size N
and degree d is defined by 3d vectors in FNq , written
(~vr)r=0..d−1, (~wr)r=0..d−1, and (~yr)r=0..d−1.
A vector ~x ∈ FNq is a solution of Q when
∀r ∈ 0..d− 1, (~vr · ~x)(~wr · ~x) = (~yr · ~x)
where · is the inner product on vectors in FNq .
It is convenient to use affine combinations of variables rather
than linear ones. To this end, we simply use a distinguished
variable x1 ∈ ~x and set x1 = 1. In the following, we often
omit x1, writing e.g. (x+ 1)y = z for (x+ x1)y = z.
QAPs are closely related to arithmetic circuits, that is,
circuits with additive and multiplicative gates connected by
wires that carry values in Fq: we encode each wire in the circuit
as a linear combination of QAP variables, effectively inlining all
additive gates, and we encode each (binary) multiplicative gate
as a quadratic equation, by setting ~v and ~w to the corresponding
linear combinations of their two input wires, and setting ~y to
zeros except for a variable that holds the multiplication output.
Accordingly, we will often refer to the variables ~x as the ‘wires’
of Q. Arithmetic circuits and QAPs are ‘universal’, inasmuch
as they can encode binary circuits (see §V-D2), but they are
still very low level. As would be the case if we were compiling
to hardware or FPGAs, we will need to unroll loops, and to
encode dynamic memory accesses. On the other hand, each
wire carries a large integer modulo q, rather than just a bit,
so we can hope for efficient encodings of most operations on
source C integers.
For Pinocchio provers, cryptographic processing is essentially
linear in the degree of the QAP, so we can already give an idea
of our programming cost model: linear operations (additions,
and multiplications by constants) are free, inasmuch as they
can be inlined in equations, whereas multiplications cost one
equation each.
D. A first programming example
Consider the simple C program listed below (on the left) and
an equivalent arithmetic circuit (on the right), with variable r
for the program output.
int main() {
int a = read_char();
int b = read_char();
write_int( (a + 1) * a * b );
return 0;
}
Their semantics is captured by a QAP of degree 2, defined by
two equations ab = t and (a+ 1)t = r. In this particular case,
assuming that the verifier checks that the two input characters
fit in 8 bits (that is, a, b ∈ 0..255), none of the operations in
the program overflows, and one easily checks that any solution
in Fq for q > 232 is also a solution on machine integers.
E. Polynomial Encodings
Before moving on to compilation, we give an informal idea
of the mechanisms used to convey a proof of knowledge of a
correct valuation to a QAP in zero knowledge. These materials
are used only in §VI.
Instead of separately proving (and verifying) each quadratic
equation, we encode all of them into a single equality between
high-degree formal polynomials in Fq, and then we test this
equality at a single random point s ∈ Fq. Indeed, by the
Schwartz-Zippel lemma, a non-zero polynomial of degree d
evaluates to 0 at most on d roots out of q elements, and thus
for d ≈ 220 and q ≈ 2254, the probabilistic test on s wrongly
accepts a non-zero polynomial with a probability well below
those usually considered for computational safety.
Given Q of size N and degree d, we fix a formal polynomial
δ[X] with distinct roots (αr)r=0..d−1 and define 3N Lagrange
polynomials ~v[X], ~w[X], and ~y[X] (one for each variable of Q)
such that, for each r ∈ 0..d − 1, we have ~v[αr] = ~vr, and
similarly for ~w[X] and ~y[X]. Thus, ~x is a solution of Q if and
only if, for each r ∈ 0..d−1, we have (~v[αr] ·~x)(~w[αr] ·~x) =
(~y[αr] ·~x) or, equivalently, there exists a polynomial h[X] such
that
(~v[X] · ~x)(~w[X] · ~x) = (~y[X] · ~x) + h[X]δ[X] (1)
Given ~x, the worker computes the polynomials above, computes
h[X] as the result of a large polynomial division, and then
‘only’ proves that this polynomial equality holds.
To this end, Pinocchio relies on a representation of Fq as the
points of an elliptic curve, with point additions for additions,
bilinear pairings for multiplications, and a fixed generator G.
(Thus, every point P is of the form n.G for some n ∈ 0..q− 1
but extracting n from a random P is hard.) At key generation,
it samples a secret s ∈ Fq and generates keys that enable
the worker (and the verifier, for the public I/O variables) to
evaluate each of the polynomials above on the curve—without
disclosing the value of s. Finally, using a few pairings, the
verifier checks that those factors are well-formed, and multiplies
them to check that (1) holds at s on the curve.
Polynomial encoding for our first example. Let K =
{1, a, b, t, r} index the 5 wires used in the QAP. We define 3
series of polynomials (vk)k∈K , (wk)k∈K , and (yk)k∈K by
their values at two roots (say r0 = 0 and r1 = 1), set
to 0 except for va[r0] = 1, wb[r0] = 1, and yt[r0] = 1
to encode the first equation, and v1[r1] = 1, va[r1] = 1,
wt[r1] = 1, and yr[r1] = 1 to encode the second equation.
Let v =
∏
k∈K kvk[X], and similarly for w and y. We
compute v[X] = X + a, w[X] = b(1 − X) + tX , and
y[X] = t(1 − X) + rX so the single polynomial equation
v[X].w[X] = y[X] + d[X].h[X] that captures the semantics
of our C program becomes
(X + a) (b(1−X) + tX) = t(1−X)+rX+X(X−1).h[X]
For instance, for a = 2, b = 5, t = 10, r = 30, we have
v[X] = X + 2, w[X] = 5 + 5X , y[X] = 10 + 20X , and, after
some arithmetic, we have indeed (vw − y)[X] = 5d[X].
III. COMPCERT
CompCert [4] is a full-fledged certified compiler for the
C programming language. It has been specified and proved
correct using the Coq proof assistant: each intermediate
language comes with a semantics, and each compilation pass
comes with a theorem stating that it does not introduce new
behaviors. These theorems are of the form
∀p : good,∀p′, Compile(p) = bp′c → Jp′K ⊆ JpK. (2)
In this statement, good is the set of C programs whose
behavior cannot go wrong. This hypothesis is rather strong—it
is not a decidable property. However, for some programs, it
can be automatically discharged by static analysis [5]. The
notation bp′c means that the compilation returns a value p′ as
opposed to an error. Finally, JpK denotes the set of behaviors
of a program p, explained next.
A. Execution traces
The behavior of a good terminating program is described
as a set of traces, each trace consisting of a list of events
and a final return value (see Figure 2, including definitions
from Events.v and Behaviors.v in CompCert 2.4). An event
is either a call to an external function, or a volatile memory
access (load and store), or an annotation.
Global variables can be labeled in the source as volatile, to
mean that the environment can provide a value for every load
and observe the value of every store. Volatiles do not affect
the rest of the memory (as opposed to external calls), so they
are well-suited to model I/O.
Annotations are statements that can appear in the source and
in any intermediate language. Their execution has no effect
other than being recorded in the trace; they are thus guaranteed
to be preserved across all compilation passes.
Events may record run-time values, of type eventval, includ-
ing 32-bit machine integers (Vint i) and pointers. Machine
integers are constructed from (mathematical) integers using
Int.repr, and interpreted as signed (resp. unsigned) integers
using Int.signed (resp. Int.unsigned).
B. Compiling and running our first example
Recall the C program given in §II. The functions read_char
and write_int, along with other I/O routines, are defined in
our custom header file p8q.h, as follows: a public input is
modeled by an annotation that claims the range of the next
input value, followed by a read from a volatile location; an
output is modeled by a write to a volatile location. Thus, our
program has behaviors of the form Terminates tr Int.zero
for many traces tr of the form below (in informal syntax):
annot input(0, 0xFF)
vload input_public → 12
annot input(0, 0xFF)
vload input_public → 37
vstore output_run_time ← 5772
CompCert successively transforms the source program
into intermediate representations, down to assembly code.
Among these representations, we are mostly interested in
RTL, for which we implement and formalize a back-end to
quadratic arithmetic programs, presented in §IV and §V. RTL
is a Register Transfer Language, with three-address code on
infinitely many pseudo-registers [6]. For instance, our sample
C program yields the following RTL code.
main() {
29: x29 = annot "input"(0, 0xFF)
27: x4 = volatile load int32 "input_public" 0()
17: x19 = annot "input"(0, 0xFF)
15: x3 = volatile load int32 "input_public" 0()
9: x9 = x4 + 1
8: x8 = x9 * x4
7: x30 = x8 * x3
4: volatile store int32 "output_run_time" 0(x30)
2: x5 = 0
1: return x5 }
Inductive event : Type :=
| Event_syscall‘(ident)‘(list eventval)‘(eventval)
| Event_vload‘(memory_chunk)‘(ident)‘(int)‘(eventval)
| Event_vstore‘(memory_chunk)‘(ident)‘(int)‘(eventval)
| Event_annot‘(ident)‘(list eventval).
Definition trace : Type := list event.
Inductive program_behavior : Type :=
| Terminates‘(trace)‘(int)
Fig. 2. Execution traces (omitting cases for wrong or diverging behaviors)
IV. VERIFIABLE PROGRAMMING WITH PINOCCHIOQ
Our certified compiler is a branch of CompCert with a
new back-end that symbolically interprets RTL to generate a
quadratic arithmetic program, which can then be passed to
Geppetto’s cryptographic engine to generate keys.
We also provide a (concrete) interpreter that runs RTL and
collects intermediate values, which can then be passed as
witnesses to Geppetto’s engine to produce evidence, which can
in turn be checked against some program I/O.
Operating at the level of RTL lets us focus on specific
compilation issues, notably the efficient encoding of operations
on integer registers, leaving CompCert to handle the rich syntax
and semantics of standard C and perform front-end optimiza-
tions. In particular, we configure CompCert to aggressively
inline code and propagate constants, inasmuch as our compiler
will unfold all calls and all loops. Even so, RTL remains more
concise and more convenient than, e.g., the explicit arithmetic
circuits manipulated in the first Pinocchio compilers.
One central issue is the selection of arithmetic encodings,
inasmuch as QAPs only add and multiply field elements. To
match the 32-bit semantics of CompCert and RTL registers,
we track overflows on arithmetic operations, and we switch
between arithmetic and bitwise representations only to truncate
their results and perform binary operations (||, &&, <=, . . . ).
For instance, multiplying two registers costs one wire and one
equation, but truncating the result is 64× more expensive, re-
quiring one wire and one equation for each bit of the raw result
(see §V-D3). To achieve practical performance, our compiler
precisely tracks integer ranges and representations, enabling
us to avoid, postpone, or share most binary decompositions.
Our formal contribution has two main components, outlined
below, and detailed in the next sections.
A. An abstract interpreter for RTL (§V)
The first component implements both the compiler and the
worker. This modularity is achieved by interpreting RTL with
two different implementations of arithmetic:
• a direct implementation, as operations in Pinocchio’s finite
field, for the worker to compute the output; and
• a custom implementation, as symbolic arithmetic oper-
ations, for the compiler to perform range analysis and
generate quadratic equations.
This modularity also helps us separate, in the proof, the invari-
ants of the different components. A shared state abstraction
models the memory state, by providing primitives to store and
load registers, to assign values, etc. The interpreter follows the
control-flow of the RTL program and produces an execution
trace, which is concrete in evaluation mode since all the inputs
are known, and symbolic in key-generation mode, since run-
time public and private inputs are not known yet. Thus, the
key-generation mode produces a QAP, and the evaluation mode,
a solution to this QAP.
Partial correctness of our compiler states that, roughly, for
every good program (according to CompCert) such that the
compiler returns a system of equations Q and a symbolic trace,
any solution of Q restricted to the program I/Os yields a valid
trace instance for the source program. Formally, the compiler
is always allowed to fail, and it does on some programs:
after inlining and partial evaluation, it will reject non-trivial
pointer arithmetic and complex control flows (see §V-F). Recall
that Pinocchio, its siblings, and more generally compilers to
circuits are not meant to support all C programs. PinocchioQ
supports their main techniques and optimizations; §VII reports
its evaluation on various sample programs.
The results of our RTL interpretations (first producing a
QAP, then producing its solution) can then be passed to
Geppetto [2] to produce the cryptographic argument and check
its validity. For functional correctness at run-time, it is essential
that these symbolic and concrete interpretations be closely
synchronized. In particular, whenever the compiler may apply
an optimization that depends on the outcome of static analyses
and affects the resulting QAP, the worker must know whether
the optimization was applied, in order to collect matching
evidence. (For example, it may need to know how many
bits were used in the binary decomposition of an arithmetic
value, in order to collect their valuation). To communicate
this information, the compiler generates an additional stream
of hints, and the worker consumes those hints to guide the
collection of evidence. This hint mechanism does not interfere
with the partial correctness of our compiler, but its failure may
prevent the worker from producing verifiable evidence.
B. Polynomial encodings (§VI)
The second component of our formalization establishes the
correctness of Pinocchio’s polynomial encoding, thereby linking
the conclusion of the cryptographic checks to the existence of
a solution of the quadratic equations system. Given a QAP Q,
public I/Os, and cryptographic evidence, computational knowl-
edge soundness yields (with high probability) a valuation ρ of
the wires of Q that extends the I/Os and such that d divides
vw − y (reusing the formal polynomial notations of §II), and
we prove that any such valuation also yields a solution of Q.
Our two certified components are independent, as long as
they agree on a representation and denotation of QAPs. Putting
all the pieces together, including CompCert from C programs to
RTL, we prove that, for every ‘good’ C program, this valuation
ρ finally yields a valid source trace (§V-G). Before detailing
them in the next two sections, we illustrate our compilation
process on a programming example.
C. Another programming example
The C code below checks that the worker knows two non-
trivial factors of some integer N . It can be seen as a simplified
RSA key-generation verifier, operating on small integers for
simplicity—with RSA, N would be a 2048-bit product of two
secret primes.
#include <p8q.h>
int main(void) {
int N = read_public_int(0, INT_MAX);
int a = read_private_int(8); // equations (3)
int b = read_private_int(8); // equations (3)
assert (a - 1); assert (b - 1); // equations (4, 5)
assert (N == a * b); // equations (6, 7)
return 0; }
At runtime, the program inputs first N , then two known
factors a and b (which may be obtained by any means, e.g. by
having computed N earlier as their product). N is a public
input; in contrast, a and b are private inputs: the verifier cares
only about their existence, whereas the worker may wish to
keep them secret. The PinocchioQ header file defines their two
input functions as follows:
• read_public_int(x,y) reads a 32-bit volatile and inserts
a range annotation: PinocchioQ will assume that the read
value is in range [x,y]. Since the input is public, the
verifier will dynamically check this range condition.
• read_private_int(k) reads a k-bit integer. Since the
input is private, the verifier cannot directly check its
range condition; instead, PinocchioQ reads its k-bit binary
representation, one volatile bit at a time.
The program then proceeds with three run-time assertions that
a 6= 1, b 6= 1, and N = ab. CompCert does not natively
support assertions, often used in verification-oriented code. To
support them within the semantics of ‘good’ C programs, we
encode assertion failure as non-termination: our header file
defines void assert(bool c){ if(c){} else {while(1);}}
so that any trace of a terminating execution ensures that all
program assertions have succeeded.
Putting everything together: if the program has a finite trace
reading N , a, and b, then the verifier can conclude that the
worker indeed knows two factors of N . At compile-time, the
trace is of the form
annot input(0, 0x7FFFFFFF)
vload input_public → x2
vload input_private → x3
...
vload input_private → x18
To compile our program, PinocchioQ first calls CompCert’s
front-end to obtain the corresponding RTL, then it symbolically
interprets it and generates the QAP of size 21 (its number of
wires) and degree 20 (its number of equations) listed in Fig. 3.
Comments in the C code refers to equations in the figure. For
instance, the RTL multiplication that evaluates the right-hand-
side of the equality in the final assertion and puts the result in
register x21 is interpreted by extending the QAP with a new
wire for x21 and an equation relating it to the product of the
values held in the registers that hold a and b.
x3 to x18 are bits: (1− xi)xi = 0 for i = 3..18 (3)
a− 1 is not null: (
∑7
i=0 2
ix3+i − 1)x19 = 1 (4)
b− 1 is not null: (
∑7
i=0 2
ix11+i − 1)x20 = 1 (5)
x21 is the product ab: (
∑7
i=0 2
ix3+i)(
∑7
i=0 2
ix11+i) = x21
(6)
Input x2 equals x21: x2 × 1 = x21 (7)
Fig. 3. QAP compiled from the C program of §IV-C
Other operations may require encodings. For instance, the
first two assertions are interpreted by showing that their
arguments are non-null. In a field, this is equivalent to providing
their inverses, hence we introduce wires x19 and x20 for
those, and ‘inverse’ equations (4) and (5). See §V-D4 for
the preconditions of this encoding.
Each private bit input (16 in total for a and b) also requires a
new wire xi. Since the worker may a priori pick any element of
Fq for xi, not just 0 or 1, we include equations (1−xi)xi = 0
to check that xi is indeed a bit. The arithmetic representations
of a and b, used in other equations, are obtained as weighted
sums: for instance, a’s bits are input on wires x3 to x11 and
a’s symbolic value is the linear combination
∑7
i=0 2
ix3+i.
D. Implementation summary
The Coq development is available at https://vc.codeplex.com.
Excluding CompCert, it has 9 kLOCs (half specifications and
implementation, half proofs) supplemented by a few hundred
lines of OCaml for the impure parts of the compiler (mostly
reading and writing files to interoperate with Geppetto’s crypto-
graphic runtime). It comes with examples in C, illustrating the
use of public and private inputs, and some meta-programming
to efficiently handle verification tasks (see §VII).
V. CERTIFIED COMPILATION
The interpreter described in §IV relies on 3 nested compo-
nents:
• an abstract domain for machine integers and their oper-
ations (§V-B), with a simple, concrete implementation
(§V-C) used by the worker to run the program, and a
more involved, stateful, symbolic implementation that
accumulates quadratic equations (§V-D) to compile the
program;
• a representation of the program state (§V-E), supplement-
ing abstract integers with pointers and integers known at
compile time, and a simple model for allocating, reading,
and writing memory and for pointer arithmetic;
• an RTL interpreter (§V-F), handling the program control
flow and its trace.
Each component is specified so that they can be implemented
and proved correct independently. Next, we explain their
formalization, highlighting key aspects of the proof.
A. Monotonic State and Error Monad
We first describe a state monad (implemented in Monads.v)
used in most of our specifications to represent computations
that depend on a state, may update it, and may also fail
with an error message. A distinctive feature of this monad
is that computations are monotonic: the final state comes with
a proof that it is related to the initial state. The datatype is
parameterized by a type S of state, a reflexive transitive relation
incr on states, a type E of error, and a type A of returned value.
Such a computation, for each initial state s, returns either an
error Error e or a value a and a final state s’ in relation with
the initial state.
Context (S: Type) (incr: relation S).
Inductive result (E A: Type) (s: S) : Type :=
| Result (a: A) (s’: S) ‘(incr s s’) | Error (e: E).
Definition t (E A:Type) : Type := ∀ s, result E A s.
For brevity we write STm.t A for the datatype t S incr E A.
B. An abstract domain for machine integers
This domain models operations on integers; its interfaces
and specifications appear in AbInt.v. Integer values may be
unknown at compile-time, so they are represented symbolically
(as values of type c). The domain provides basic operations
such as addition or multiplication. Its implementation may be
stateful—for instance, in key generation mode, it will keep
track of the range of these values. Therefore each operation is
wrapped in our state monad.
We give below an excerpt of its interface, with signatures
for bitwise logical AND, addition, and multiplication.
Record arith (c: Type) : Type := {
land: c → c → STm.t(c * (option nat * option nat));
add: c → c → STm.t c;
mul: c → c → STm.t (c * bool) . . . }.
Every operator returns a result value (‘variables’, of type c);
some also return hints, i.e., details about how the operation
has been carried on. For instance, in key generation mode,
a fresh equation is introduced for each multiplication in the
general case, but the compiler sometimes knows that one of
the operands is a constant and that no equation is needed. Such
facts are then communicated to the caller through the returned
Boolean. These facts are ultimately logged in a file to be used
for proof generation. Similarly, bitwise operations—such as
bitwise logical AND—may require a binary decomposition of
theirs operands. In such cases, the returned natural numbers
tell (for each operand) how many bits are introduced in this
decomposition.
The specification of this domain is given with respect to
a relation solution that provides an interpretation of the
variables in the state of the domain as mathematical integers.
It may also have a state invariant Inv.
We give below the specification for addition. Its first
hypothesis states that a call to add on variables x and y from
state σ returned as result variable z and updated state σ’.
The second hypothesis asserts that the initial state satisfies
the invariant. Then, for every solution ρ for the final state,
the solution for variable z is the sum of the solutions for
variables x and y. A solution is a valuation of the variables
as mathematical integers, but operators of the value domain
like add are meant to model machine arithmetic. Therefore,
the values of x, y, and z are cast to machine integers in the
conclusion (using Int.repr). Moreover, the resulting state still
satisfies the invariant.
Definition add_sound (a: arith) (Inv: S → Prop)
(solution: S → (c → Z) → Prop):
∀ x y σ z σ’ H,
add a x y σ = STm.Result z σ’ H →
Inv σ →
∀ ρ, solution σ’ ρ →
Int.add(Int.repr(ρ x))(Int.repr(ρ y)) = Int.repr(ρ z)
∧ Inv σ’.
Next, we present two implementations of abstract integers,
corresponding to the two modes of the interpreter.
C. Concrete integers as elements in Fq
The first implementation, used in proof-generation mode,
represents integers as field elements (see AbIntModp.v). The
domain is stateless and has a trivial invariant. The ‘solution’
of this domain is the function that maps each point to the
corresponding mathematical integer between 0 and q − 1.
This implementation is not completely trivial, since no
overflows should happen. Consider the case of addition of two
elements x and y in the field, seen as non-negative integers
smaller than q. If their sum is larger than q, then the result
does not accurately model their addition as machine integers.
The soundness of the implementation also relies on the fact
that q is prime. For the specific 254-bit values of q used in
the Geppetto engine, we establish this fact in Coq using the
primality checker of Grégoire et al. [7] based on Pocklington
certificates.
D. Symbolic integers and quadratic equations
The second implementation of integers is used in key-
generation mode; it treats run-time values symbolically. (Its
implementation is in QAP.v; its correctness proof is in
QAPProof.v.)
Quadratic equations are represented by three sparse maps
cV, cW, and cY, from equation names (a.k.a. roots) to symbolic
values (see below). Therefore, for each root r, these maps
define a quadratic equation whose solution ρ satisfies:
JcV[r]Kρ× JcW[r]Kρ = JcY[r]Kρ (8)
where JcV[r]Kρ is the element of Fq obtained by evaluating
the symbolic value cV[r] given the solution ρ.
A symbolic value is either: a linear combination of wires
in Fq and a range; or a binary decomposition. These values
are stored in a table in the state of the domain. The domain
clients only get indices to the table, so they cannot forge values
(e.g., with an incorrect range). The domain invariant ensures
the consistency of all representations.
Linear combinations are by far the most efficient repre-
sentation. They are modelled as partial maps from wires
to coefficients, each wire being an input, an output, or an
intermediate result. The (finite) set of bound wires is writtenW .
Among the various possible implementations of this signature,
lists tend to be the most efficient one, especially in terms
of memory but also in time, since these maps are extremely
sparse. (The signature of linear combinations is defined in
LinearCombination.v; its list implementation is in LCList.v.)
To each linear combination is associated a range into which it
must be evaluated (see §V-D1).
Binary decompositions are required for operations, such as
bitwise AND, right shift, and comparisons (≤), that access
individual bits of integers. They are modelled as lists of linear
combinations, each representing a bit of the value.
1) Range analysis: There are three kinds of integers involved
in the compilation: elements in field Fq (which can be seen
as integers between 0 and q − 1), mathematical integers in Z,
and 32-bit machine integers. In particular, the QAP is a system
of equations over Fq that model computations on machine
integers.
To make explicit the link between a field element, represented
as a linear combination of wires, and the corresponding machine
integer, each such linear combination is associated with a range:
an interval of mathematical integers in which the given value
would be if the program was operating on mathematical integers.
These intervals are computed from the annotations attached to
public inputs, the checks that private bitwise inputs are indeed
bits, and a range analysis for all operations. (Interval arithmetic
is coded in Interval.v.)
Given an element x ∈ Fq and an interval [a; b] ∈ Z2 that
is not too large (that is, b − a < q), the projection of that
element on this interval is (if it exists) the unique mathematical
integer y ∈ [a; b] in the interval such that x and y are congruent
modulo q.
To establish the soundness of the various arithmetic oper-
ations specified in §V-B, we define (and prove) as invariant
Inv the following properties: for every solution to the QAP,
for every value in the QAP:
• if the value is a linear combination of wires with a
predicted range, projecting its valuation for this solution
on this range succeeds; and
• if the value is a binary representation, projecting the
linear combinations representing the bits on the range 0..1
succeeds.
The invariant follows from these properties: a valuation of the
wires is a solution of the QAP only if the values of the public
inputs satisfy their annotations, and hence fall in their predicted
ranges; and if a computed range is too large (i.e. wider than q)
then compilation fails. (An alternative is to trigger a truncation
to 32 bits; see §V-D2.)
2) Bitwise representation and truncation: Switching from
bitwise to arithmetic representation is easy: as illustrated in
§IV-C, the linear combination is the sum of the weighted
bits, and the range is 0..2` − 1 where ` is the number of bits.
The other direction, however, requires to ask the worker for a
binary decomposition of a given linear combination a, that is, to
provide those bits as private inputs. We rely on range analysis
to bound the number of bits that are required, by asking for
the range to be included in 0..2` − 1 and then requiring ` bits.
(We leave as future work other optimizations to minimize `,
notably for signed integers.) We then add to the system `+ 1
equations:∧`−1
i=0(1− bi)bi = 0 ∧ 0 = a−
∑`−1
i=0 2
ibi
to ensure that all the bis are bits, and that a is equal to its
binary representation. (Technically, taking ` too small would
not compromise soundness, so the guess need not be proved
correct; however, bad guesses would compromise completeness,
as the worker would not be able to satisfy the last equation.)
Binary decompositions are costly, and should be avoided
for performance. To this end, known binary representations
are cached in the QAP, using the state monad. To establish
soundness of the arithmetic operations, we thus extend the
QAP invariant with the property that, for any solution, the
stored binary representations equal (modulo 232) the arithmetic
values they represent.
Binary decomposition often operates on values whose range
is wider than 232, as the result of prior arithmetic operations.
To implement our source 32-bit semantics, we then discard the
higher-order bits immediately after generating the last equation
above. Hence, only truncated values with at most 32 bits are
cached.
3) Arithmetic and bitwise operations: Arithmetic operations
take linear combinations and produce a new one.
To compute the addition of two values (named by their
indices a and b), we first read in the state the linear combi-
nations x and y that they represent; then we add their linear
combinations (operator LC.add), we add their ranges, and we
generate and return a fresh index for the resulting value. The
code is given below:
Definition add a b :=
do (x, xr) ← get_lc a; do (y, yr) ← get_lc b;
fresh_lc (LC.add x y) (Interval.add xr yr).
Multiplication is more involved. There is an easy case when
one of the operands is known at compile-time. In this case, as
for the addition, we perform the multiplication on the linear
combinations and on the ranges. Otherwise, when both operands
are arbitrary linear combinations, a fresh wire w is returned and
a new equation x × y = w is stored in the QAP. A Boolean
hint indicates whether a new wire has been introduced.
Definition mul a b :=
do x ← get_lc a; do y ← get_lc b;
let ’(x, xr) := x in let ’(y, yr) := y in
match Interval.is_const xr with
| Some i => do v ← fresh_lc (value_of_lc (
LC.muln (f_of_z i) y, Interval.muln i yr));
STm.ret (v, false)
| None => match Interval.is_const yr with
| Some j => (* similar case *)
| None => let range := Interval.mul xr yr in
do w ← fresh_wire Bank_Local;
let res := lc_of_wire w in
do r ← fresh_eqn x y res;
do lc ← fresh_lc (value_of_lc (res, range));
STm.ret (lc, true) end end.
Bitwise operations, on the other hand, operate on binary
decompositions, and produce a new one. They trigger binary
decompositions on demand (the need for such a decomposition
is passed as a hint to the worker), which are then cached for
performance reasons.
We rely on the following bitwise, algebraic encodings of
logical operators (using C syntax below) on single bits:
!a = 1− a a && b = a ∗ b
a || b = a+ b− a ∗ b a ^ b = a+ b− 2a ∗ b
Further, bitwise logical operators (&, |, ^) and bitwise shifts
on integers (<<, >>) are coded as operations on bit lists.
The soundness of all these operations, as stated for addition
in §V-B, rely on the invariant given is §V-D2.
4) Equality checks and assertions: How to implement
equality checks a == b ? Recall that, in C, this operator returns
1 if a and b are equal, and 0 otherwise. If a, b ∈ 0..1, then
we may use 1− a− b+ 2ab. In the general case, a naive idea
would be to trigger a binary decomposition of a− b. We rely
on a more efficient encoding, requiring just two equations. Let
x be the result of the test. We prove knowledge of an auxiliary
private input y such that
(a− b)y = 1− x ∧ (a− b)x = 0 (9)
If a = b, then x = 1 by the first equation, otherwise x = 0 by
the second equation, so the encoding is correct. Its completeness
is more subtle, as we need a witness for y. If a = b, then we
set y = 0. Otherwise, we compute y = (a− b)−1 in Fq .
Another difficulty is to determine conditions on the range of
a and b. Indeed, we must interpret a = b as equality modulo 232,
whereas the encoding above establishes equality modulo q. For
example, consider the program fragment
unsigned int a = 3;
unsigned int b = 1422342341 + 2872624958;
assert(a != b);
According to the C semantics, the assert fails since the addition
on the right-hand-side of b yields 232 + 3, so this program has
no valid trace. In this case, C compilers may issue a warning,
but more generally a and b may be the result of complex
intermediate computations, depending on values provided by
the worker. Using the encoding above, 232 does have an inverse
in Fq so, without some cautious management of integer ranges
at compile time, we would let the worker prove that the program
actually has a trace.
We use the same idea to encode assertions assert(g). To
ensure that the guard g is not null, we use an equation similar
to (9, left), namely g × y = 1 where y is a fresh wire. Any
solution proves that g is not null in Fq , so we also check that
there is at most one null value in the predicted range of g.
E. State abstraction
This layer models the RTL state, i.e., its memory and
registers contents. (Its specification is given in AbState.v.)
It is parameterized by an instance of the value domain that
operates on variables of some type c. It uses a dedicated
expression language (of type expr, defined in Expr.v), with
loads and pointer arithmetic, parameterized by the type of its
variables.
It features several operators, including sa_assign(r, e)
which models the assignment to register r of the result of the
local computation described by the expression e; sa_eval(e)
which forces the evaluation of expression e to a concrete value;
sa_assert(e) which takes into account that expression e is
kown to evaluate to a true value in the current state.
Its soundness is stated with respect to a relation mi between
abstract and concrete states, at a particular solution. The
proposition mi ρ σ sp rs m reads as follows: abstract state σ
and concrete state (sp, rs, m) (where sp is the stack pointer,
rs the register state, and m the memory state) are related
at solution ρ. The actual meaning of being related is not
relevant to specify a sound abstraction; however, a particular
implementation will be proved sound with respect to a particular
instance of this mi relation.
Each operator of the state_abstraction record comes with
a soundness property; for instance, the sa_assign operator has
the following specification.
Definition sa_assign_sound : ∀ dst e σ σ’ H,
sa_assign abState dst e σ = STm.Result tt σ’ H →
∀ ρ, solution σ’ ρ →
∀ sp rs m, mi ρ σ sp rs m →
∃ v,
rtl_eval_expr ge sp rs m e tt = STm.Result v tt I
∧ mi ρ σ’ sp (rs # dst <- v) m.
Its first hypothesis states that evaluation of the sa_assign
operator to a destination register dst, expression e and state σ
returned updated state σ’. The soundness condition states that,
for any solution ρ to the final state σ’, and any concrete state
(sp, rs, m) related to the initial state σ at ρ, expression e
evaluates in the concrete state to some value v and the updated
concrete state (after assigning v to the destination register) is
related to the final abstract state.
This domain communicates with the impure part of the
compiler, through a dedicated state monad, called oracle.
This monadic interface features operators to implement inputs,
outputs and hint events. This interface has no specification: the
compiler makes no hypothesis about its behavior.
The implementation of this domain (in AbStateImpl.v and
AbStateImplProof.v) embeds the oracle, the value domain,
and a memory—implemented as a map from concrete addresses
to symbolic values—to implement loads and stores. The mi
relation used to prove the soundness of this implementation
states that all values in the memory actually reflect the values at
the same addresses in the RTL memory, and that the invariant
of the value domain is satisfied.
F. RTL interpreter
Finally, the interpreter follows the control-flow of the source
program and produces an execution trace (files Run.v and
RunProof.v). Since interpretation may take place at compile-
time, run-time values may be unknown; therefore the interpreter
is parameterized by a type var of symbolic names for values.
The interpreter only provides partial support for conditionals:
it forces the concrete evaluation of the guard (calling sa_eval)
to decide which branch to take and, if the Boolean value of
this expression cannot be computed (at compile time), it only
support the two patterns below.
Assertions are defined in C as conditional infinite loops,
and interpreted by calling the sa_assert function of the state
abstraction, explained in §V-D4.
Conditional assignments such as x = e; guarded by a
Boolean condition b are interpreted as an equivalent, un-
conditional assignment x = (e - x)*b + x; provided x is
initialized and e has no side effect. This enables us to compile,
for instance, the program listed below, which takes as inputs
a, b, N and repeatedly adds b to a, with N setting the actual
number of iteration. At compile-time, an upper bound P on
N is provided, leading to a QAP of degree linear in P .
int32_t P = read_compile_time();
int32_t N = read_private_int(31);
assert ( N <= P );
int32_t a = read_public_int(0, INT_MAX);
int32_t b = read_public_int(0, INT_MAX);
for( int i = 1 ; i != P ; ++i )
if ( i <= N ) a += b;
As was the case for C and RTL, our backend comes with a
notion of trace that records annotations and I/O on volatiles.
Given a valuation ρ of the symbolic var as CompCert’s run-
time values, a trace r of the interpreter, and a symbolic return
value v, we can compute a corresponding concrete run-time
behavior, written concrete_behavior ρ r v. Note that the
valuation ρ is not directly a solution to a QAP. Given a
QAP solution, we first evaluate QAP expressions to values in
Fq; then, relying on ranges, we project them to mathematical
integers; and finally we truncate them to 32-bit integers.
G. Main theorem (formally)
Our correctness theorem (in QapGenProof.v) is given below:
Theorem qap_gen_correct :
1: ∀ (prog: Csyntax.program),
2: good prog →
3: ∀ (fuel: nat)
4: (tr: atrace val)
5: (v: val)
6: (σ: QAP.cqap (zp large_prime)),
7: qap_gen prog fuel = Result (tr, v, σ) →
8: ∀ (ρIO: W → Z),
9: (∃ ρ, extends σ ρIO ρ ∧ cqap_solution σ ρ) →
10: (∃ ρ’, extends’ σ ρIO ρ’ ∧
11: concrete_behavior ρ’ tr v ∈ J prog K)
The ‘goodness’ hypothesis (line 2) states that the source
program cannot go wrong, according to the CompCert C
semantics (see §III).
The ‘static’ hypothesis (line 7) states that the compiler
successfully returned a symbolic trace tr, a symbolic final
value v, and a final QAP σ. (The fuel argument is a technicality
to ensure that the compiler always terminates: compilation fails
when it runs out of fuel.)
The ‘dynamic’ hypothesis (line 9) states the existence of a
solution ρ to the QAP that coincides with (extends) the inputs
and outputs recorded in the valuation ρIO: the cqap_solution
relation means that all equations and all range conditions on
the public input values are satisfied.
The conclusion states the existence of a terminating execution
of the source program, with a trace characterized by ρIO, tr,
and v, as follows. This execution uses a valuation ρ’ (from
variables to machine integers) that coincides with ρIO on the
input and output variables (line 10) and that also provides
witnesses for the intermediate program variables. This valuation
is used to evaluate the symbolic values in tr and v in order to
build the concrete trace (line 11). The proof relies on CompCert
correctness theorem (equation (2) in §III), specialized to the
front-end compiler from C to RTL (in RTLComplements.v)
composed with the correctness of our symbolic RTL interpreter.
VI. POLYNOMIAL ENCODING AND TESTING
So far, we have shown that any solution to the QAP compiled
by PinocchioQ ensures the existence of a trace of the source
program with matching I/Os (§V) and explained that the
knowledge of such a solution can be further reduced to a
polynomial divisibility test, which can be probabilistically
checked using an elliptic-curve encoding (§II). We wrap up our
formal development by showing that the divisibility test indeed
also ensures the existence of this trace. (As explained in §I,
the computational soundness of the Pinocchio’s cryptographic
check is outside the scope of this work; its formal proof would
require tools for probabilistic, polynomial-time reasoning, such
as EasyCrypt [8].)
Using the notations of §II, given a QAP Q, assume
knowledge of a valuation ρ : W → Fq such that δ[X]
divides v[X]w[X] − y[X], where v[X], w[X] and y[X] are
the Lagrange polynomials defined by Q and ρ. From these
assumptions, we establish that ρ is a solution of Q, in the
sense of §V-D.
The core of this formalization is a construction of v[X],
w[X] and y[X], via a new library of Lagrange polynomials. It
relies on the SSREFLECT [9] and MathComp [10] libraries for
constructive arithmetic and algebraic reasoning in Coq. It uses
their support for finite fields, polynomials, and big operators.
Lagrange interpolation. (See verifier/Lagrange.v.) Given
` points in the plane whose first components are pairwise
distinct, our library constructs their Lagrange polynomial and
establishes its three main properties:
(a) it fits the points;
(b) it has degree at most `; and
(c) it is the unique polynomial with these 2 properties.
Polynomial encoding. We now suppose the existence of a
valuation ρ of the wires of some QAP Q. Recall that ρ
determines the values of v[X], w[X] and y[X] at the roots αr
of Q; these three polynomials can thus be easily constructed
using our library for Lagrange polynomials.
Moreover, we also construct the divisor polynomial δ[X] as
the product of monomials X − αr for all roots αr in Q.
Solution to the QAP. From this construction and from the
divisibility assumption (that comes from the cryptographic
check) stating that δ[X] divides v[X]w[X] − y[X], we can
deduce, by standard reasoning on polynomial roots, that ρ is a
solution to Q.
Putting everything together. The formalization presented in
this section can be summed up as:
Theorem verifier_correct (σ: QAP) (ρIO: W → Z) :
check_range σ ρIO →
∀ ρ, extends σ ρIO ρ →
dvdp (polyD σ) (polyQ σ ρ) →
cqap_solution σ ρ.
where:
• check_range checks that the interpretation of the input
and output variables given by ρIO satisfies the ranges
declared by the programmer (see §IV-C), and
• dvdp (polyD σ)(polyQ σρ) is the divisibility assumption,
subject to cryptographic testing.
Composing this result with the main theorem presented in
§V-G, we obtain our final theorem, listed below, relating the
polynomial post-condition of cryptographic proof verification
to the existence of a finite trace of the source C program.
Theorem pinocchioq_correct :
∀ (prog: Csyntax.program)
good prog →
∀ (fuel: nat)
(tr: atrace val)
(v: val)
(σ: QAP.cqap (zp large_prime)),
qap_gen prog fuel = Result (tr, v, σ) →
∀ (ρIO: W → Z),
check_range σ ρIO →
(∃ ρ, extends σ ρIO ρ ∧
dvdp(polyD σ)(polyQ σ ρ)) →
(∃ ρ’, extends’ σ ρIO ρ’ ∧
concrete_behavior ρ’ tr v ∈ J prog K).
VII. EVALUATION
We evaluated the functionality and performance of our
certified compiler on a series of C programs, summarized
below. Using the Verasco static analyzer of Jourdan et al. [5],
we have also confirmed that all these programs have a well-
defined semantics, as defined by CompCert.
Our experimental results are gathered in Table I. For each
source program, the table gives the number of RTL instructions
in the program both statically (after CompCert’s front-end)
and dynamically (after PinocchioQ’s loop unrolling); the size
(number of wires) and degree (number of equations) of the
generated QAPs; and the times to compile from RTL to QAP;
to interpret the program and generate all intermediate wire
values; to generate keys given the QAP; to generate evidence
given the keys and a QAP solution; and to verify this evidence.
These last three numbers rely on Geppetto’s cryptographic
engine, extended to accept QAPs and valuations produced by
PinocchioQ.
Timing measurements have been performed on a Linux
desktop with an Intel® Core™ i7-3520M CPU @ 3.6 GHz and
8 GiB of DDR3 RAM. Each number is the average execution
time of five runs (standard deviation is low). The partial
columns present the times spent in the RTL interpreter only,
whereas the total columns present the whole running times
including the CompCert front-end (common to both modes,
performing some optimizations as constant-propagation and
common-subexpression-elimination) and the final printing of
the outputs (serialization of large QAPs is costly).
First and Factorization are our running examples.
Bachet takes N as public input and checks that it equals the
sum of four squares, taken as private input. Bachet’s theorem
guarantees the existence of such a decomposition for all positive
integers, which is sometimes used to prove that N is positive in
zero-knowledge. (PinocchioQ relies on a more efficient binary
decomposition; see §V-D2.)
Matrix takes three n×n matrices A, B, and X as input, for
some n fixed at compile-time. (We use n = 10 and n = 100.)
The matrices A and B are public, while X is private to the
worker. The program checks the equation AX = B, thereby
implementing verifiable matrix division.
SHA takes a message as input: a bytestring of fixed length
(4, 96, or 159) and returns its SHA1 cryptographic hash; its
main loop performs 80 iterations mixing bitwise and arithmetic
operations, thereby testing ranges and binary decompositions.
(We also experimented with SHA256.)
SAT is a family of C programs, each checking that a
particular Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form (CNF) is
satisfiable, by taking a Boolean assignment as private input and
evaluating the formula. It illustrates the efficient verification of
an NP problem, and the use of an application-specific encoding
in C, before calling PinocchioQ, discussed in the introduction.
We wrote an auxiliary translation from CNF formulas to C,
as follows. Each variable is coded at a private input bit; the
negation of x is coded as 1 − x. Each clause is coded as
the sum of all their literals. Finally, the whole formula is the
multiplication of all its clauses, and the program asserts that it
is not null. The encoding is satisfiable if there exists a valuation
of its integers in 0..1 that makes the resulting multiplication
non-zero. We formally proved in Coq that our translation is
sound: if the encoding is satisfiable, then the initial formula is
satisfiable (file SatCoding.v). The encoding is not generally
complete, since (in principle) a 32-bit overflow might nullify
the product.
The worker expects as private input a valuation that solves
the SAT instance. The cryptographic argument justifies that the
encoding is non-null hence, by correctness, that the original
formula is SAT and that the worker knows a solution.
We evaluate our compiler on particular SAT instances based
on the Boolean encoding of a variant of the pigeonhole
principle, stating that we want to put n items into exactly
n containers such that no container contains more than one
item. We report results for n = 20 and n = 50, respectively.
For instance, for n = 20, the CNF has 3820 disjunctions on
400 variables, and hence the resulting QAP has 4220 equations.
Experimental Validation. These benchmarks are typical C
programs used for evaluating VCs. In particular, Matrix and
SHA1 are Geppetto’s sample programs, modified to fit our
use of volatiles for I/O, and thus provide a fair basis for
comparison. Certified compilation is slower than with Geppetto,
a more complicated and imperative compiler, but otherwise the
two compilers yield QAPs of similar degrees, and thus yield
similar cryptographic performance. As expected with Pinocchio
TABLE I
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Case RTL instructions Size (#wire) Degree Compile (s) Evaluate (s) KeyGen Prove Verify
static dynamic I/O private partial total partial total (s) (s) (ms)
First 21 34 4 2 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 10
Factorization 40 167 2 19 20 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 12
Bachet 63 527 2 64 65 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.02 12
Matrix (10) 97 37 892 201 1800 1900 0.22 0.37 0.15 0.18 0.90 0.34 13
Matrix (100) 97 17 251 542 20 001 1 080 000 1 090 000 143.72 178.62 66.34 68.37 229.37 247.70 228
SHA1 (4) 180 29 313 7 36 138 37 082 4.59 5.65 0.14 0.28 25.82 49.75 11
SHA1 (96) 180 58 831 30 77 004 78 925 10.02 12.26 0.29 0.45 26.33 32.98 11
SHA1 (159) 180 88 251 46 116 325 119 209 15.33 18.55 0.43 0.62 32.56 49.83 11
SAT (20) 39 462 40 262 1 4220 4220 0.22 9.27 0.72 9.01 1.46 1.25 14
SAT (50) 583 902 588 902 1 63 800 63 800 5.67 1843.5 12.42 1842.9 14.07 18.81 12
schemes and already observed in their earlier implementations,
worker costs grow linearly with the degree on the QAP, whereas
verifier costs include 10 ms for pairings and then grow linearly
with the size of the I/O (only noticeable here on matrices).
VIII. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSION
A. Pinocchio
Parno et al. [1] presents a first practical compiler and
runtime system for verifiable computations, enabled by the
non-PCP scheme of Gennaro et al. [3]. Their Python compiler
translates a subset of C similar to ours to arithmetic circuits
supplemented with special gates e.g. for binary decompositions.
They show that, at least for some sample code, cryptographic
verification is indeed faster than recomputation. Many variants
of their cryptographic schemes now exist, e.g., Danezis et
al. [11] present a minimalistic ZK-SNARK with most succinct
proofs for binary circuits coded as ‘square programs’, i.e.
using equations of the form (~v · ~x)2 = 1. Several efficient
implementations are also available [12], [13], [2], exploring,
e.g., advanced encodings for random memory access and
cryptographic processing (not supported by PinocchioQ). Some
of these first compile programs to a custom instruction set, and
carefully program QAP interpreters for those instructions [14],
[15], [16], [17]. Although the QAP techniques we use are
largely folklore, to our knowledge we are the first to formally
study their correctness with regards to the source-program
semantics.
Geppetto [2] is a recent compiler and engine for Pinocchio
that further reduces the worker overhead while increasing
its flexibility, via the notions of MultiQAPs and bounded
cryptographic bootstrapping. It has been applied to larger
examples, such as the parsing and validation of complex
X.509 certificate chains for TLS and Helios. By analogy, it is
to PinocchioQ what gcc -O3 is to CompCert. PinocchioQ
is based on ideas from Geppetto—similarly, Geppetto uses
clang as front-end compiler, and symbolically interprets LLVM
code both for compiling and for executing verifiable programs.
PinocchioQ does not support MultiQAPs, bootstrapping, and
some advanced optimizations, but is nonetheless a realistic
compiler with a similar performance profile for the examples
of §VII. Conversely, our formal development led to a better
understanding of subtleties and side conditions in QAP en-
codings, uncovering soundness bugs in early versions of the
Geppetto compiler (e.g. its equality check was not correct
in case of overflows, see §V-D4). PinocchioQ also relies on
their optimized cryptographic engine to generate keys, and to
produce and verify evidence.
B. Cryptographic compilers and certification
Other parametric cryptographic schemes have been turned
into compilers, sometimes supporting low-level programs coded
in C, and producing various kinds of specialized circuits. For
example, Zahur and Evans [18] propose to keep the actual
circuits implicit, as we do. SPDZ [19] and its implementations
also rely on compilation to arithmetic circuits, rather than
binary circuits, to achieve fast multiparty computations.
A few of these compilers have been formally proved sound.
Almeida et al. [20], [21] developed a framework to verify C
implementation of cryptographic algorithms and automatically
generate optimized assembly code that retains the security
properties established at the C level; this work is also based
on CompCert. More closely related to zero-knowledge proof-
of-knowledge protocols, Almeida et al. [22], [23] developed
ZKCrypt, a certified compiler for a subset of Σ-protocols. Seen
as a zero-knowledge scheme, PinocchioQ is more succinct and
general, but less efficient on simple statements.
Translation validation [24] provides another approach to
certification: instead of certifying the compiler once and for
all, an untrusted compiler returns certificates that can be
independently checked to validate its results, one program
at a time. This approach is useful inasmuch as the certificate
checker is simpler to prove correct than the full compiler, but
we are not aware of any convenient certificate format when
compiling to quadratic arithmetic programs.
C. Verification of cryptographic primitives
PinocchioQ does not address the verification of Pinocchio’s
elliptic curve algorithms and their Geppetto implementations,
a separate hard problem. Several recent works formalize fast
multiplication algorithms on selected curves [25], [26]. To
our knowledge, however, there is no formalization of pairing
algorithms or their implementations, also required by Pinocchio.
Other verification results may be applied to certify C
implementations of cryptographic functionalities compiled by
PinocchioQ; for instance, Appel [27] formalizes an implementa-
tion of SHA1 in C, similar to the one we compile and evaluate
in §VII.
D. Conclusion
We presented the first certified compiler for general verifiable
computing, from C code with diverse operations on integers
down to a polynomial test efficiently enforced by cryptography.
Based on Pinocchio and CompCert, PinocchioQ compiles
programs and enables one to prove and verify their executions,
as prescribed by the C semantics.
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